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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
15 September 1966

MEMORANDUM

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We are in general accord with the attached memorandum which sets forth the outlook for the 21st UN General Assembly, the major issues it will face, and the projected US positions concerning those issues. The session will be a difficult one, aggravated by the uncertainty that Thant will continue as Secretary-General, the rising African bitterness over the South African and Rhodesian questions, the growing impatience with the stalemate on disarmament, and the widespread alarm over the course of the Vietnam war. To the extent to which the US position on these and other issues is set forth, we do not at this time foresee any particular difficulties, although some of those positions--e.g., on Chinese representation--are designed merely to hold the line. We note, however, that--with the exception of the recommendations concerning the dispute over UN peacekeeping operations--the paper projects no US initiatives for dealing with the problems of the United Nations itself. The UN has lost ground as an effective organization in the last few years, and unless steps are sooner or later taken to strengthen it, the UN will be reduced to the minimal role in world affairs which the USSR and France would wish it to play.

The following additional comments, addressed to specific points in the memoranda, are intended either to clarify or to provide additional information:

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2. Vietnam (p. 2): Although Vietnam is not on the agenda, it is possible that the non-aligned may attempt to introduce an Assembly resolution calling for cessation of hostilities.

3. Peacekeeping (p. 7): Peacekeeping problems will probably not be given the attention they deserve because of the apathy of the Afro Asians and the firm stance of the Soviet Union and France on the constitutional problems involved.

4. Chinese Representation (p. 6): Despite developments inside China and statements by Peking's leaders that China does not want membership, both of which will affect the chances of Peking winning more votes, it is possible that some members may change their position to the disadvantage of Nationalist China. For example, Chile is now expected to vote for Peking's admission, although it will abstain if the resolution calls for the expulsion of Taiwan. Some African countries may change their position depending on the outcome of the debate on African colonial issues. (The Africans, the largest regional bloc in the UN, will often determine the Assembly's position.) As evidenced last year by the unexpected tie vote on the substantive resolution and the large number of abstentions, it is always difficult to predict the outcome of the Chirep issue, and until the actual voting takes place this year probably in early November, there will be many reports of possible shifts in the voting pattern.

5. Outer Space (p. 6): Negotiations on the Outer Space treaty may be bogging down as the USSR is insisting that an "equal conditions" clause be inserted in the treaty --a clause which would require signatories which grant tracking stations to one country to grant them to another.

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6. African Problems (p. 3): A possible British resolution for mandatory sanctions against imports of chrome and pig iron from Rhodesia will affect the US which buys both products. We may also be asked to support a British resolution for mandatory sanctions against oil shipments to Rhodesia, directed at Portuguese Mozambique.

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